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Abstract
Aesthetic philosophers, theorizing literary critics and editors, and 
reflective commentators on the restoration of paintings, buildings, 
and monuments have repeatedly shown that the concept of the work 
is anything but self-evident. The present essay examines major at-
tempts to conceptualize this problematic area since the 1930s, before 
proposing a solution based on the semiotics of C. S. Peirce and The-
odor Adorno’s negative dialectics that will help clarify thinking when 
practices of preservation and conservation are being determined. 
The language and thinking come ultimately from scholarly editorial 
activity; the working assumption is that, with suitable adjustments 
for the medium, it will apply to other historically orientated forms 
of cultural conservation.
Introduction
I should choose my writing to be judged as a chiselled block, uncon-
nected with my hand entirely. (Virginia Woolf, 1908/1975, p. 325)
A theory of the work does not exist, and the empirical task of those who 
naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in the absence of 
such a theory. (Michel Foucault, 1969/1986, p. 104)
Work: only four letters, satisfyingly brief, apparently simple. In English 
the verb and the noun are the same, so that the concept of the work retains 
its direct connection to the hand of its maker. The concept loses it in 
most other European languages: so we have German Werk (as opposed to 
Arbeit), French oeuvre (vs travail), Italian opera (vs lavoro), Spanish obra (vs 
trabajo), Russian proizvedenie (vs rabota), and so on. Getting a grip on the 
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concept is notoriously difficult in whatever language; and, by and large, 
editors and conservators who want to get things done avoid taking the 
trouble. Yet, if the nature of the work undergoing expert treatment dur-
ing cultural heritage conservation or scholarly editing is assumed to be 
self-evident, then the danger looms that practitioners will, despite the best 
of intentions, misrepresent works or just flounder about with self-contra-
dicting solutions when faced with difficult cases.
Aesthetic philosophers, theorizing literary critics and editors, and re-
flective commentators on the restoration of paintings, buildings, and mon-
uments have repeatedly shown that the concept is anything but self-evident. 
The present essay examines some attempts to conceptualize this problem-
atic area since the 1930s, before proposing a solution that will, it is hoped, 
help clarify thinking when practices of preservation and conservation are 
being determined. The solution on offer is unavoidably provisional in that 
it reflects the background of the author. The language and thinking em-
ployed here come ultimately from scholarly editorial activity; the working 
assumption is that, with suitable adjustments for the medium, it will apply 
to other historically orientated forms of cultural conservation.1
The first step is to characterize what can loosely be called the tradi-
tional understanding. Whether the work in question is allographic (as in 
the case of a literary work, where any copy is an instance of it) or auto-
graphic (as in the case of a painting, where the physical object is identical 
with it), we have traditionally come to the question of the work with a 
series of assumptions: that the work is in some sense objective, standing 
over and apart from its maker and its perceivers and that, conversely, its 
histories of making and reception stand over and apart from its essential 
nature as a work; that the work has the potential to persist over time; and 
that it has an identity that sustains true descriptions of it (for example, 
that the Iliad is in hexameter). Performance-works, it has long been rec-
ognized, raise their own problems of definition because of the gap be-
tween script and performance (for example, Is an unsung song that exists 
only in written form truly a song?). But other seeming paradoxes such as, 
If the Mona Lisa is in the Louvre, where is Hamlet?, are readily dealt with 
by the allographic/autographic distinction.2 This was the general under-
standing into the late 1960s when some memorable accounts of the liter-
ary work were put forward.
The granting of objectivity to the work placed conservation, editing, 
and interpretation in a position essentially external to it. The argument of 
the present essay is that this 1960s position was and is basically wrong; that 
the post-structuralist strands of thought that succeeded this position got 
it wrong but in another way; and that, counter-intuitively, preservation, 
conservation, and interpretation are always and unavoidably intrinsic to 
the work. Fundamental philosophical positions undergird each of these 
arguments. They are examined here in turn. A solution is proposed and 
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then applied to the problematics of historic building conservation. But, 
first, some examples of art conservation that expose the inadequacy of 
the traditional understanding and that beg the questions that this essay 
seeks to answer will be briefly described.
Works in Distress
In 2005, with the publication of its fourth volume of A Corpus of Rem-
brandt Paintings, the Rembrandt Research Project, which had commenced 
in 1968, was only one volume away from completing its verification of the 
authenticity of the many hundreds of paintings that have been claimed 
as authorial by successive catalogers since the late nineteenth century. 
Numbers have been radically trimmed from the most optimistic claims, 
some very significant de-attributions have been made, and other paint-
ings queried. Historical information, extensive scientific testing, and con-
noisseurship have brought us as close as possible to knowing what exactly 
Rembrandt’s oeuvre is made up of. 
July 2006 was the cause for further celebration: the four hundredth 
anniversary of the birth of Rembrandt. Numerous public events marked 
the occasion in Holland, including important exhibitions of his recently 
restored paintings. In the Mauritshuis art museum in The Hague, for in-
stance, several thoroughly restored Rembrandts were proudly on show, 
together with reports on, and a video of, the cleaning processes that the 
paintings had undergone. This sort of exhibit makes for a different kind 
of response to the traditional one of simple admiration. We are learn-
ing to see paintings differently. This has been happening with Rembrandt 
in a concerted way since the late 1980s through a series of exhibitions 
around the world that have been curated with scholarly care and exten-
sive research. We are regularly invited to absorb and thus to naturalize the 
conservatorial gaze. 
This is apt to come at some cost to our preconceptions. X-radiographs 
on display at the Mauritshuis showed for instance that, in the famous Anat-
omy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp (1632), the corpse being dissected (based on 
an executed criminal whose right hand had earlier been cut off for some 
other malfeasance) acquired a well-proportioned hand even though Rem-
brandt had originally painted him in his non-entire condition. It is not a 
botched job by some later perfecter. It is authorial.3
We are not used to thinking of paintings as having previous versions 
or of their colors as changing over the decades by different amounts; yet 
they do, and conservators find ways of rebalancing the paintings to ap-
proximate their (fancied) original state. This same painting had previ-
ously been restored in 1951 when an eighteenth-century addition was de-
liberately obscured. The addition was a numbered list of the names of the 
doctors watching the dissection; it was placed in a drawing held by one of 
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them, and corresponding numbers were added next to each portrait. The 
restoration of 1997–98 partially removed the obscuring medium so that 
now the information is just legible. 
Sometimes restoration is justified by rhetorical appeal to the mastery 
of the artist (or alternatively to the aesthetic values of the painting as an 
object: the two are not the same thing but are often elided). Sometimes 
the ground of appeal is the painting’s historical witness: here, the fact of 
the interpretation being felt desirable in the eighteenth century and its 
taking the form it did. This restoration wants to have it both ways: to be, 
now with a wonderful new clarity, of Rembrandt but also (with a little less 
clarity) of the eighteenth century. It appeals to two different standards of 
textual authority (as a scholarly editor would put it) simultaneously. What 
is it, then, that we are seeing? What effect does such intervention have 
upon our notion of the work? The following example of a very famous, 
recent restoration will help answer the question.
Pinin Brambilla Barcilon’s restoration of The Last Supper of Leonardo 
da Vinci, completed in 1999, was based on an informed historical aware-
ness of the earlier and botched attempts of her predecessors and on a 
comprehensive regime of photographic and scientific testing of the sur-
face and subsurface, as well as upon access to Leonardo’s own accounts 
of the painting. His use of a dry rather than fresco technique left the 
painting vulnerable to the absorption of water, and deterioration was 
noted as early as 1517. Since then, numerous restorations have been at-
tempted. Barcilon’s removing of the earlier overpaintings, her revealing 
of the remaining Leonardo fragments, and her undetailed and remov-
able completion in watercolor of the painting around the fragments, was 
an immensely painstaking task of some twenty years. Its progress was regu-
larly reported in newspaper stories often syndicated around the world, 
and usually celebrated as a heroic endeavor on behalf of Western cultural 
heritage. The Last Supper is an autographic work. It needed restoration 
and received it: so, apparently, no philosophical problem there. 
Until, that is, Martin Kemp (1990) argued at a conference in 1990 that, 
far from being the natural and inevitable response, Barcilon’s method of 
restoration, like all restorations, involved critical interpretation: 
I am not someone who believes that the artist’s intentions are either 
imponderable or irrelevant to the historian who wishes to understand 
the work and, by extension, to any spectator who wishes to enrich the 
potential of their viewing. In Leonardo’s case we are fortunate in pos-
sessing a large body of notes to help us identify his “intentions”—in 
the most obvious sense of this term. . . . [But any] artist’s intentions, 
and most especially during the deeply pondered and protracted execu-
tion of a work like the “Last Supper”, will be a complex and shifting 
compound of conscious and unconscious aspirations, adjustments, re-
definitions, acts of chance and evasions. It is unlikely that there was ever 
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a stable set of transparently accessible intentions. . . . Any programme 
of restoration of a badly damaged and extensively repaired artefact 
which aims to reinstate some measure of the original experience has 
to make an implicit choice as to which of the artist’s intentions or 
groups of intentions and which of the various spectators’ criteria are 
to be satisfied. (p. 18)
Our “conception of what is essential in a work of art,” Kemp concludes, 
“determines what demands we make on visual images” (p. 20). In this 
case, earlier readings of The Last Supper as a history painting had deter-
mined efforts to restore it as such. Barcilon’s scientific gaze, by contrast, 
privileged the authorial fragment.
Compare Kemp’s conclusion to a startling reflection made in 1995 on 
another form of cultural preservation. Alois Pichler participated in the 
international text-encoding community’s efforts during the 1990s to find 
satisfactory methods of transcribing manuscript and print documents and 
of marking them up for electronic storage. The change in medium means 
that mark-up is unavoidably interpretative. “Our aim in transcription,” 
Pichler reasoned, “is not to represent as correctly as possible the originals, 
but rather to prepare from the original text another text so as to serve as 
accurately as possible certain interests in the text.” And he added: “what 
we are going to represent, and how, is determined by our research inter-
ests . . . and not by a text which exists independently and which we are go-
ing to depict” (1995, p. 690). In 1997 Allen Renear, a prominent member 
of the same community, objected to what he called this antirealist view of 
text, but his arguments seem finally to rest on the unproblematized no-
tion that texts are or must be objective realities that encoders would do 
well to represent truthfully (Renear, 1997, pp. 117–124).4
Here is another case, a personal one. I began editing the Lawrence and 
Mollie Skinner novel set in Australia The Boy in the Bush for the Cambridge 
Works of D. H. Lawrence series in 1983. By 1988 it had become clear to 
me that my experience of this work, now that I had nearly finished editing 
it, was highly unusual. Radical immersion in the waters of authorial textu-
ality is disorienting, especially to one’s preconceptions about what works 
are. In a paper at the 1989 Modern Language Association conference, 
I noted several aspects of Lawrence’s writing life that had become clear 
to me. Intellectually and artistically, Lawrence rarely stood still, he was 
ceaselessly experimental, and he worked fast. Textually, he was prolific 
and untidy. He produced multiple versions of most of his works whether 
from scratch or in revision, and where he had to prepare copy for two 
publishers the copies were nearly always at variance. He never finished his 
works in a Flaubertian way. They were always in a process of becoming or 
of (only gradual) abandonment—a process of working his way through 
related themes that did not respect publication dates. Nor was this the-
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matic unfolding over time single-stranded; while writing any particular 
novel Lawrence was simultaneously turning his hand to writing shorter 
pieces, as well as reading widely. 
Once this essential continuity is glimpsed one is tempted, as a literary 
critic, to get beyond the great-works approach and try to recover the bio-
graphical-textual mesh from which they rose to public view. But to do this, 
I argued, we need first to break our long-standing habit of confusing the 
editorially established reading text with the work. Of course, that text is 
commercially adaptable to popular and student formats, it is well-suited to 
first-time readers, and it is a reliable, common reference point for textual 
quotation in articles and books. It is all of these things, but it is not the lit-
erary work. For me, that had become a more capacious entity of which the 
reading text I established was a useful but only partial representation.
These last three cases point toward a conclusion with consequences. 
When it comes to the abstract question of the identity of the work that is 
being transcribed, Renear seems to deny the inevitability of the encoder’s 
mediation. Similarly, Barcilon’s reliance on scientific testing and natural-
ized reading practices (the seductive authorial fragment that the movie 
camera can linger on in close-up) also allows the hand of the conserva-
tor to disappear as a constitutive part of the object we look at. That this 
consolation is an illusion is exposed by the conflicting conservatorial ap-
peals in the 1997–98 Anatomy Lesson. In the Lawrence case, my experi-
ence of tracking in a text-biographical way the continuum of writing was 
not matched by the commercially denominated work The Boy in the Bush, 
which it was my task to perpetuate in a scholarly edition. 
Although Barcilon’s position is a very defensible one, although Re-
near’s might seem like common sense, although the new Anatomy Les-
son seems to be able to eat its cake and still have it, and although the 
Cambridge Lawrence is a robustly pragmatic compromise, none can give 
us access to what does not exist: the true or real Leonardo, the essential 
Rembrandt painting, the printed or manuscript text in itself, or the work 
of Lawrence as an essence outside of the editor–conservator’s representa-
tion. The conserved painting, the transcribed text, the completed schol-
arly edition do not, then, exist unproblematically, whether on the wall, in 
the computer file, or in the Cambridge hardback. In an important sense, 
each is completed by its readership both during conservation and after. 
This is an unsettling conclusion. It suggests that we need to know more 
about what works are. A closer examination of the 1960s consensus is 
therefore necessary.
Theory of the Work in the Late 1960s
In 1968 René Wellek and Austin Warren added an important chap-
ter to a new edition of their influential Theory of Literature (1948), called 
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“The Mode of Existence of a Literary Work of Art.” It brought together 
and crystallized many of the insights and working assumptions of the New 
Criticism. That movement had emerged in the 1930s, displaced belle- 
lettristic and literary-historical approaches during the 1940s and 1950s, 
and was itself, by 1968, on the verge of being superseded by the new post-
structuralist movement. 
In their essay, Wellek and Warren run through the various conceptions 
on which the idea of the literary work could be thought to be founded. It 
could not be identical with the physical medium that bears its inscription 
since every copy would then be a different work. It could not consist of 
someone’s reading it aloud since that would ignore the physical inscrip-
tion and its stability, in comparison with the evanescence of performance. 
It could not be merely the experience or response of the reader since 
then the work would have no independent identity to discuss. This “affec-
tive fallacy” had been famously paralleled by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe 
C. Beardsley in 1946 with the “intentional fallacy.” With the latter in mind, 
Wellek and Warren confirmed that neither could the work be the same 
thing as the experience of the author, whether during writing (since we 
can have no part in that experience) or via the author’s later articulations 
of what was meant to be conveyed in the writing (since the writer may 
have lost touch with the original experience and be acting now only as 
an interpreting reader). Rather, poems have an independent public exis-
tence: the poem is, as Wimsatt and Beardsley had put it, “detached from 
the author at birth and [it] goes about the world beyond his power to in-
tend about it or control it” (1946/1954, p. 5). But there was a further pos-
sible grounding: could the work, Wellek and Warren asked, be regarded 
as the sum of all experiences of it, its existence granted only as a potential 
cause of the experiences? This ingenious explanation was however, they 
pointed out, thwarted by its ignoring the “structure of determination” 
(1968, p. 152) intrinsic to the work’s meaning. None of these groundings, 
then, underwrite the necessary conditions of the work’s identity over time 
or its capacity to be known. 
This compelling diagnosis of failed definitions was unfortunately not 
matched by an equally clear proposal that would underpin the requisite 
independence from document, author, and readers. If none of the work’s 
manifestations in the world did the job, then invocation of an ideal iden-
tity seemed unavoidable. But how to incorporate the manifestations at the 
same time? While conceding that works are not ideal in the perfect way 
that, say, a triangle is, because they change in their readings and thus in 
a sense enjoy a “life,” Wellek and Warren (1968) argued that works must 
somehow have a “substantial identity of ‘structure’” (p. 155) and be com-
prehensible in relation to “a system of norms[,] of ideal concepts which 
are intersubjective. They must be assumed to exist in collective ideology, 
changing with it, accessible only through individual mental experiences, 
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based on the sound-structure of its sentences” (p. 156). This attempt to 
bring together several of the dimensions in which the work undoubtedly 
participates in fact bows, as we shall see, to the epistemology of Edmund 
Husserl and more directly to the 1930s aesthetic philosophy of his stu-
dent Roman Ingarden, whose work was only very belatedly available in 
English. The Wellek and Warren essay hovers uneasily between this broad-
ening and the strong underlying assumption visible in their characteristic 
phrase, the “concrete work of art” (p. 147).
The latter had already become a byword in literary criticism, which 
should therefore be primarily interested in the aesthetic dimension, not 
in the psychological, historical, or sociological. The term verbal icon, as 
Wimsatt and Beardsley had famously called it in 1954—in other words, 
the aesthetic object—announced an orientation that would also condi-
tion the pursuit of scholarly editing. Behind the concrete work of art lay, 
in some sense, an ideal text; this was to be the editor’s quarry. It was neces-
sarily an ideal text, typically seen as the author’s intended one, which, for 
one reason or another, had not achieved publication in that form.
G. Thomas Tanselle brought this pursuit to an increasingly sophisti-
cated level of definition in essays written from the 1970s to the 1990s.5 His 
conjoining of intention with the ideal required the invocation, whether 
at first or second hand, of the work of Husserl. E. D. Hirsch’s influential 
Validity in Interpretation of 1967 had shown the way. In relation to the defi-
nition of the work, Hirsch’s argument crystallized the Zeitgeist. For Hirsch 
(1967), the textual meaning of a literary work must be unchanging (“de-
terminate,” p. 230) since only such a thing can act as a true object of 
study. “Verbal meaning,” he argues, “is that aspect of a speaker’s ‘inten-
tion’ which, under linguistic conventions, may be shared by others” (p. 
218). It is “unchanging and interpersonal” and “determined once and 
for all by the character of the speaker’s intention” (p. 219). For published 
works, the author’s meaning is the publically accessible part of it—com-
municated intention, not what was going on in the head of the “biograph-
ical” author as such (p. 244). This communicated meaning is, as we shall 
see, like one of Husserl’s intentional objects. 
For the scholarly editor this argument amounted to an underwriting 
of the ideal of the intended text of the work, which only the accidents and 
contrarieties of production had prevented from being realized. It would 
be the editor’s job, by means of comparison of the multiple versions of 
the work, to identify which variant readings were the impediments to that 
realization and to remove them, by eclectic combination of readings from 
different versions if necessary, thus establishing the text of final autho-
rial intention. The rejected readings would be recorded, but only in the 
subsidiary position of the textual apparatus. The foundation of this con-
servatorial approach in Husserl’s philosophy—of which most practicing 
editors were blissfully unaware—needs next to be considered.
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The Ideal Text: Husserl and Ingarden
The founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), re-
fused to entertain conceptual presuppositions. Like other epistemologists 
he was looking for a basis for absolute certainty in knowledge. His slogan 
was “To the things themselves.” By “the things” he meant acts of conscious-
ness and the things that are constituted by them. He wanted to get clarity 
there before the traditional problems of philosophy were approached. His 
first business as a phenomenologist was therefore to describe the phe-
nomena. He gave perceptual priority to the subject (i.e., the perceiver), 
postponing the question of the ontology of the object (Kant’s “things-
in-themselves,” which were not accessible to the mind).6 He came to the 
conclusion that mental acts are intentional in the sense of being of or 
about an object—or, more strictly speaking, of or about a would-be object, 
something supposed to be beyond those mental acts.
A much-discussed example of Husserl’s intentionalism is how we come 
to know what a tree is; we can have many views of a tree but none of them 
fully presents the tree to us. Only the intended object as a whole (the tree 
itself) unifies all of the acts of perception. The “object as a whole” exists 
for us as an entity only because the various sensory “takes” we have of it 
postulate its existence as a way of ordering them. This is a separate ques-
tion from whether the tree exists—which, within Husserl’s orbit of thought, 
comes to seem a less important one.
Husserl’s intentionalism appears to be the ultimate source of Tanselle’s 
view of the text of the literary work, probably as inflected by Hirsch.7 Tan-
selle concludes from the existence of many documentary texts, that seem 
to be versions of one another, that each represents but does not present 
the work. The concept of the work exists, as it were, as a way of making 
sense of them. The documentary texts may be said to be somewhat like 
sense experience—what Husserl calls “immanent,” that is, directly acces-
sible to the mind—but the intended object (the tree, the work) is pre-
sented as transcendent, that is, outside the mind’s direct experience. In 
both cases there is a unifying assumption that there is an object out there 
(the tree, the work) that is the unity behind the disparate appearances 
(or documentary texts). The assumption in both cases sustains the experi-
enced variability, allowing it to seem to cohere. This, I believe, is the basic, 
normally unstated warrant of the idealist argument in editorial thought.
Roman Ingarden and the Work
Husserl’s gap between the material and intentional object created the 
space for an aesthetic theory. His student, Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), 
is important here as carrying on the phenomenological flame. Ingarden’s 
ideas about the work would ultimately be taken up, as we have seen, by 
some Anglo-American aesthetic philosophers and New Critics in the 
1960s, broadening their thinking in the process, and, somewhat later, by 
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editors of the Anglo-American school, who by and large until then had 
been content to understand their activity methodologically.
Given its complexity (such as I have outlined above in summarizing the 
Wellek and Warren arguments), the literary work, Ingarden (1931/1973) 
observes, “is never fully grasped in all its strata and components but always 
only partially” (p. 334). Although, in reading, it can only be apprehended 
“in the form of one of its possible concretizations” (p. 336), when reading 
we are usually not conscious of this distinction. Being aware of the differ-
ence between the work and its concretizations, however, gives meaning 
to the term, the “life of the literary work”—which is the name of one of 
his chapters. The fact that a work can be created, changed by revision, 
or destroyed by its author before publication is further evidence of its 
having a “life,” but also proof that, unlike a living being, it is not an “onti-
cally autonomous object” (p. 346). It only “lives” passively, dependent as 
it is on readers to concretize or change it (p. 352). Ingarden accepts the 
implications of his observation about the life of a literary work. He recog-
nizes that a history of readings, influencing one another over time, can 
change the literary work insofar as it lives in its concretizations, but those 
readings cannot change the identity of the literary work itself that he has 
already distinguished from them. 
But what is this essence that is left over from the concretizations? He 
does not mean the physical document since that is merely a founding stra-
tum. He has already allowed that the work is not ontically autonomous. 
Being only therefore, as he says, ontically heteronomous, it cannot be an 
ideal object. But if it is to have the separate essence postulated by his argu-
ment, it has to be in some sense transcendent,8 even as it always “seems to 
dissolve” in the “manifold variety” of its readings. At the level of sentences, 
he argues, the writer cannot create “genuine realizations of ideal essences 
or ideal concepts” but only draw on their ideal forms. The writer can “ac-
tualize” them but not—the stronger form—“realize” them (p. 362). Ideal 
concepts must exist, according to Ingarden (1931/1973), since without 
them linguistic communication would be impossible “in which both sides 
. . . apprehend an identical meaning content of the sentences exchanged” 
(p. 364). There are of course misunderstandings in real-life communica-
tion, but without ideal concepts the possibility of exchanging “identical 
meaning content” cannot be envisaged.9 So he staves off the “danger of 
subjectivizing the literary work or of reducing it to a manifold of concreti-
zations” but only “by accepting the existence of ideal concepts” (p. 364) 
even though he is convinced the work is not one of them, or at least not in 
the full sense. “[I]n terms of ontic autonomy,” he concludes, the literary 
work “is a nothing . . . and yet a wonderful world in itself—even though 
it comes into being and exists only by our grace” (Ingarden, 1931/1973, 
p. 373).10
Although Ingarden shows little bibliographic awareness, he is, as a 
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phenomenologist, very open to empirical and structural evidence of a 
work’s stages of existence and its functioning. But, at the end of the day 
and despite having substantially undermined it, he has to fall back on a 
belief in the transcendent condition of the literary work if his structure 
of thought is to hold. Husserl’s method of bracketing the intentional ob-
ject in order to study the subject’s dealings with it had tended, given that 
the philosopher’s attention was elsewhere, implicitly to grant the object 
a steady continuity of existence independent of its contexts. In relation 
to the work of art, this would have seemed an uncontroversial assump-
tion during the first half of the twentieth century, given the overhang of 
aestheticism, and given the doctrines and methods of modernism, for-
malist criticism of art, and New Criticism. (Cf. the epigraph to this essay 
by Virginia Woolf.) Seen in this general context, Ingarden’s book is very 
much a reflection of its period. That it spoke so directly to Hirsch, and 
to Wellek and Warren, as late as the 1960s, and filtered through them to 
Tanselle even later, helps explain why change, when it came, would prove 
catastrophic.
What Changed With the Work?: Heidegger and  
Post-Structuralism
The changes came, of course, with the various forms of post-structur-
alist theory from 1968 as they made their way—gingerly at first, trium-
phantly at last—through the anglophone world in the 1970s and 1980s. 
The new theorists adapted the radically different phenomenology of Hus-
serl’s student Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), who, in addition to his ma-
jor work Sein und Zeit (Being and Time, 1927), wrote “Der Ursprung des 
Kunstwerkes” (“The Origin of the Work of Art”) in the mid-1930s.
Heidegger was deeply affected by the pre-Socratic philosophers. 
Their successors, Aristotle and Plato, eventually made possible the En-
lightenment tradition of rational argumentation based upon the subject– 
object split. Kant posited the existence of innate, transcendental catego-
ries within the human mind (such as causation, quality, and time) that 
allow us to understand the sense impressions that we receive from the 
outside world. For Heidegger, this artificial division into inner and outer 
was the root of the problem when what the early Greek philosophers had 
recognized as the primordial dimension of Being circulated through both 
and was the prerequisite for any recognition. On this assumption, no ob-
ject can, strictly speaking, be bracketed for contemplation as Husserl’s 
method required. The Kantian tradition, which Husserl extended, had 
sprung, in Heidegger’s view, “not from a genuine perception of Being but 
from a forgetting of Being, from a taking-for-granted of the central existen-
tial mystery” (Steiner, 1992, p. 28). As soon as the essence of an object is 
recognized as an idea or meaning, its Being is consumed by being given 
directedness, as it almost automatically is, within traditional Western pro-
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cesses of thought. Their idealism requires its essential being to be located 
elsewhere, whereas for Heidegger Being is Being-in-the-world, a living of 
time rather than living in it. Knowing is not a smash-and-grab raid on the 
object but what he calls a Being-with, a concern, a not-having-power-over. 
Accordingly, Heidegger was obliged to reinterpret all forms of knowl-
edge as orientations toward Being. So he redefines truth not in terms, 
as philosophers traditionally do, of the correspondence between subject 
and object but in terms of what he calls discoveredness:
To say that a statement is true means that it discovers the beings in 
themselves. It asserts, it shows, it lets beings “be seen” . . . in their discov-
eredness. The being true (truth) of the statement must be understood as 
discovering. Thus, truth by no means has the structure of an agreement 
between knowing and the object in the sense of a correspondence of 
one being (subject) to another (object).
Being-true as discovering is in turn ontologically possible only on the 
basis of being-in-the-world. This phenomenon . . . is the foundation of 
the primordial phenomenon of truth. (Heidegger, 1996, p. 201)
What then is the nature of a work that lasts for centuries or is restored 
after damage or destruction? In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heide-
gger argues that the work, upon its creation, discloses a previously un-
thought-of world by bringing its truth into being, but in doing so renders 
the awareness of it historical. As the centuries go by, the awareness fades 
even though the physical object may not: “World-withdrawal and world-
decay,” he said, “can never be undone. The works are no longer the same 
as they once were. It is they themselves, to be sure, that we encounter 
there, but they themselves are gone by” (Heidegger, 1993, p. 167).
His example was the Aegina marbles, a ruined temple that King Lud-
wig I of Bavaria had bought in 1811 during a visit to the Greek island and 
carried off as a cultural treasure. The stones were restored speculatively 
into an integrated form and displayed in the Munich Glyptothek until the 
1960s when the elements that had been fabricated to complete it were re-
moved and the fragments alone left on display. It turned out that they had 
been damaged by the restoration. Unaware of this future fate and pre-
pared to grant the nineteenth-century restorer, Thorwaldsen, his inter-
pretation, Heidegger was nevertheless raising the question about whether 
what he calls “the work itself” can ever be encountered when it has been 
subjected to art-historical study—when it has been rendered the object of 
a science. (Similarly, the study of the processes of a literary work’s genesis 
and development through successive versions is, to the extent that it ob-
jectifies the work, necessarily inauthentic in Heidegger’s terms.11)
Heidegger’s philosophy requires a leap of faith; finally the dimension 
of Being is mysterious. That does not make it untrue, but the challenge 
of going without the traditional tools of analytical thought, which nor-
mally presuppose a subject–object division, reveals the dilemma that Der-
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rida among other post-structuralists struggled to bridge post–1968. They 
continued Heidegger’s reaction against Enlightenment modes of thought 
and in particular against the metaphysics of self-presence implied, as they 
saw it, in Husserl’s phenomenology. In it, the self-presence of the object 
as vouchsafed to the subject was the ground of meaning. It was an ideal 
meaning that reduced writing, according to Derrida, to a merely cognitive 
operation and did not explain the iteration of meaning that allows it to 
be made present to readers over and over again. Ferdinand de Saussure’s 
structuralist account of language in which meaning is always deferred—
signs refer to other signs, and meaning lying in the difference of their 
signification—allowed Derrida to free the workings of textuality from any 
anchor in intention or the writer. The ground of writing could henceforth 
be considered to be (other) writing, not authorship. This amounted to a 
new foundation, though always elusive, never achieved. Representation 
was the vehicle of meaning; recourse to the subject–object binary would 
no longer be necessary. It did not however explain the work, as witness 
the epigraph to this essay by Michel Foucault.
Editorial practitioners found this linguistic turn a hard pill to swal-
low, since they were encountering documentary traces of personal agency 
on a daily basis and were in the habit of inferring its intention. Nor did 
Saussure’s synchronic system assist with the analysis of textual processes 
of revision over time. Michel Foucault’s account of socially circulating 
discourses changing with successive epistemes or periods, and therefore 
of works being expressions of discourses rather than of authors, only re-
stated the problem in somewhat more historical ways. There was a stale-
mate. Scholarly editing has meanwhile continued to take place, but since 
the 1980s in mainly silent opposition to the dominant intellectual forces 
of the time. This was not a happy position to be in.
French Existentialism and Blanchot
Although Derrida dealt with the Heideggerian inheritance directly, 
the route to the stalemated position actually went via French existentialist 
phenomenology: from Jean-Paul Sartre, through Maurice Blanchot, and 
then to Roland Barthes’s “The Death of the Author” (1968/1977a), the 
locus classicus for the post-structuralist decentering of meaning from au-
thor to text.
Sartre had studied the phenomenology of Husserl while in Berlin in 
the early 1930s, but the existentialist form of it developed by Heidegger 
found a peculiar resonance in post-World War II France following the cul-
tural disaster of Nazi occupation. New foundations for meaningful living 
were necessary, ones that cleaned the table of old formulations. Existen-
tialism was a heroic medicine in which the role of art, standing over and 
apart from the ways of the world, would be crucial. In What Is Literature 
(Qu’est-ce que la littérature?, 1947/1988), Sartre saw writing as necessarily 
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acting in the present as a form of commitment, political and personal, 
situated in and shared with the contemporary society or “age”—and thus, 
somewhat akin to Heidegger’s account of the Aegina marbles, losing its 
relevance upon the author’s death.12 
Maurice Blanchot’s The Space of Literature (L’Espace littéraire, 1955) 
pushed the existentialist case further: 
The goal of art is an object . . . a realized action which is itself activat-
ing, which informs or deforms others, appeals to them, affects them, 
moves them—toward other actions which, most often, do not return 
to art but belong to the course of the world. They contribute to history 
and thus are lost, perhaps, in history. (1955/1989, p. 212) 
Blanchot seized the opportunity that Heidegger’s phenomenology of-
fered to differentiate categorically between the realm or space of art and 
the workaday world of purposive activity on the one hand and of self- 
confident, yet philosophically fragile, truth claims on the other. 
Art, according to Blanchot (1955/1989), was more like a substrate of 
reality than a place; Being, in the special sense Heidegger gives it, could 
spring from art into the ordinary world, or be accessed there, even if the 
disclosure (publication, say) was ultimately a compromising event. The 
work was not the same thing as the book, the latter being only “the ap-
proach and the illusion” (p. 23): 
The writer never knows whether the work is done. What he has finished in 
one book, he starts over or destroys in another. . . . At a certain moment, 
circumstances—that is, history, in the person of the publisher or in the 
guise of financial exigencies, social duties—pronounce the missing end, 
and the artist, freed by a dénouement of pure constraint, pursues the 
unfinished matter elsewhere. . . . However, the work—the work of art, the 
literary work—is neither finished nor unfinished: it is. (pp. 21–22)
While this conclusion seems promising as a defence of the study of the 
genesis of a work’s making, and of the related histories of works unfold-
ing from one another in relation to the author’s biography as I described 
above with D. H. Lawrence, Blanchot gives no such solace. This is because 
of the ultimate underpinning of the work in Being. The inexhaustible 
origin of art, Blanchot maintains, is quite impersonal: the writer cannot 
claim to be its source but can only give himself or herself up to it: “The 
poet only speaks by listening” (p. 226).
Thus Blanchot (1955/1989) disassociates the work from the writer’s 
ordinary self: “To write is to break the bond that [in speaking] unites the 
word with myself” (p. 26); “it is [the writer’s] not being himself” (p. 28). 
Therefore literature’s imaginary space is one where no-one abides: “No 
one who has written the work can linger close to it” (p. 24), not even the 
writer. Yet, because it is a void, it lends itself to having its meaning appro-
priated by successive generations of readers; it is gradually “filled up with 
everything it isn’t” (p. 11):
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The work of art does not refer immediately back to the person who 
presumably made it. When we know nothing at all about the circum-
stances that contributed to its production, about the history of its cre-
ation—when we do not even know the name of the person who made 
it possible—it is then that the work comes closest to itself. (p. 221)
The line from this isolation of the work from the author to Barthes’s 
aim of liberating the reader from the authoritative shackles of writerly 
intention becomes apparent in his essay “From Work to Text” (in French, 
1971), especially in his catchphrase: “the work can be held in the hand, 
the text is held in language” (1971/1977b, p. 157). For Barthes, like Der-
rida, the author’s life offered no point of origin for texts and therefore no 
hope of explanation for them. Existing only in language, texts could have 
neither origin nor closure. Given that their fate was to be traversed again 
and again by readers, texts could be experienced “only in an activity of 
production,” and were therefore irreducibly plural (p. 157). Participating 
in larger cultural flows of meaning, they were neither stable nor time-
bound objects. 
This became an influential position. It signally rejected the existing 
literary-critical understanding about works, and it left the editing of works 
and the study of their genesis out in the cold. And yet, despite that, the 
last twenty to twenty-five years have seen a flowering of a new kind of ed-
itorial and textual theory. While borrowing terms and benefiting from 
some of the habits of thought that post-structuralism rapidly naturalized, 
these new forms of editorial theory have had essentially to work from 
the overlooked or neglected empirical realities of documents. Attention 
turned to enunciating the importance of textual process (the genesis of 
versions of a work) rather than of finalizing its text as an authoritative 
“product”; to the theoretical and practical exploration of opportunities 
in electronic editions that would be capacious enough to document these 
textual processes; to the importance of linking particular texts, regardless 
of their authority, to their historical audiences; and to the peculiarities of 
the physical document itself, especially its mise-en-page.13 Its presentation 
could be considered a site and source of meaning, complicating that of 
the linguistic text with which earlier editors had been solely concerned.
In these ways, liberation from the final-intentions school of postwar 
Anglo-American scholarly editing has opened doors—but, ironically, to 
much the same dimensions of works that Wellek and Warren, and Hirsch, 
were ushering into anglophone consideration in their essays of the late 
1960s. Despite typically rejecting the ideal-text assumptions of editing—
and thus, in effect, rejecting the Husserlian legacy—editorial practitio-
ners have usually found little support in Heidegger. A theory of the work 
that might ground what editors do still does not exist, “and the empirical 
task of those who naively undertake the editing of works often suffers in 
the absence of such a theory” (Foucault, 1969/1986, p. 104). Foucault’s 
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warning is no less true today, despite the welcome broadening of atten-
tion to the workings of the work, if one may put it that way, that practi-
tioners have been recently engaged in.14 So . . . stalemate from another 
direction.
Whither Away for the Work?: Peirce and Adorno
What then is the way forward? I see two possibilities. The first would 
be to adopt or adapt as a basis for a definition of the work a text-defining 
semiotic that recognizes agency and history, rather than the synchronic 
model of Saussurean structuralism upon which post-structuralism rested. 
The American inventor of the doctrine of Pragmatism, C. S. Peirce (1839–
1914), philosophized in many areas, but at the center of his thinking was 
a semiotic that bypassed the subject–object binary. Peirce went back to 
the medieval scholastics, including St. Augustine and Duns Scotus, to re-
trieve a missing third term—semiotic. The effect of inserting semiosis (or 
the process of communication that mediates knowledge) into the sub-
ject–object relation is that it becomes triadic; the object cannot be directly 
available to knowledge if it can only be represented by the sign. The sign 
or representamen, according to Peirce, is “determined” by its object; it 
functions by creating (“determining”) an interpretant, which may itself 
stand as a sign to a later interpretant, and so on. 
It can be difficult to appreciate the fundamentality of Peirce’s semiotic 
at first. Peirce was trying to define the theory of the sign to stand as his 
logic and thereby as the basis of his metaphysics and epistemology. To hu-
manize or psychologize the operation of the sign would compromise this 
fundamentality. Thus, the interpretant is not a person; strictly speaking, 
it is the counterpart of the representamen and stands in an equivalent or 
developed relation to the object. The sign as a whole is therefore a rela-
tion, in fact tri-relational; it is not a thing, although a thing may become a 
sign if it takes on that relational function.15 
From this apparently severe semiotic Peirce developed a wide-ranging 
philosophical system usually referred to as pragmatism.16 His failure to 
publish an elaborated and complete form of it notoriously causes prob-
lems for those who would elucidate it from the basis of his occasional es-
says, reviews, letters, and very extensive, often undated manuscripts. The 
failure also helps explain his comparatively meager influence so far, as does 
the fact that the place that his semiotic might have occupied was taken by 
twentieth-century Saussurean structuralism. The latter is, in contrast to 
Peirce’s, dyadic (i.e., two-termed; signifier versus signified), synchronic 
(the linguistic system is analyzed at a chronological moment), and system-
atic (meaning is based on difference between terms in the system rather 
than, as for Peirce, on its practical outcomes or further development).
Peirce’s incorporation of the interpretant into the definition of the 
sign means that semiosis is understood as ongoing and diachronic.17 Every 
eggert/the conservator’s gaze
96 library trends/summer 2007
sign, therefore, “is essentially incomplete and . . . essentially developable” 
(Gallie, 1952, p. 129). Development requires a notion of community; in-
deed, Peirce stressed continuity rather than arrival in what he called the 
path of inquiry. Insofar as the “real” and the “truth” could be said to exist 
at all, they were only the limiting conditions of this continuity. They com-
mitted the community of inquirers to the testing of the always provisional 
truth-claims—just as scientists do, routinely. Public truth or “the real” is 
said to be “the idea in which the community ultimately settles down.”18
Individuals and communities therefore may be said to participate in 
semiosis, but it does not originate in them (cf. Riddel, 1995, p. 86). Peirce 
commented in a late essay of 1905, “What Pragmatism Is”: 
[A] person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is 
“saying to himself,” that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming 
into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that 
one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is 
mostly of the nature of language. (Peirce 1931–58, 5.421)
If even our private reflections function semiotically, then there can 
be no constitutive origin for meaning or knowledge outside semiosis, ei-
ther in the self or in unmediated Heideggerian Being. There can, accept-
ing this line of argument, be no “capital A” Author as pure source of the 
work. According to Peirce, there never is an “I” thinking (or writing or 
reading) that is knowable independent of the signs that signal the activity. 
And just as there can be no knowable, originating, unitary presence or 
Author outside of semiosis, so there can be no Work whose ontology is se-
cured by that Author. Rather, textual agency is restricted to those who are 
involved in the ongoing semiosis. If Peirce is right then, first, process is of 
the nature of the Work (which presumably now takes on the lower case 
w and functions only as a regulative idea, not an ideal); and, second, the 
activity of each reader in creating the interpretant is part of the work.
Textual agency is not a Peircean term. Although, in his system, the op-
eration of the sign is infinitely regressive, it is transactional. Therefore, if 
one extrapolates from his austerely logical starting point where semiosis 
is conceived as a purely functional relation, the production of both the 
representamen and the interpretant can be seen in practice to require 
agency. Nowhere is this more evident than when the production takes 
physical form in a document. In other words, a bibliographical extension 
of Peirce’s account of semiosis might form the ground of a new concep-
tion of the work.19
The importance of the physical object—the documentary dimension 
of textual communication—is something that philosophers are apt to 
overlook or treat as trivial. This is despite the fact that the document is 
the pathway into the past. But it is only a pathway: the act of reading, of 
reviving the represented idea, reinvokes the unpredictabilities and flux 
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that are always part of semiosis. Meanwhile, the document itself remains 
unaffected, stable, and open to contrary readings. This documentary di-
mension might give Peirce’s idea of the community of inquirers a force 
it presently lacks, given that it would generate the need for an account 
of the slowly changing linguistic conventions that allow communities to 
make sense of documents from the past. In the moment of reading, the 
document is inevitably a record of and from the past and lies at the cross-
section of other histories: of the book trade, generic conventions, reader-
ships, and political, social, and other discourses. For readers it is the point 
of departure and return. Its stability provides the point of focus enabling 
profitable disputation (in the present) about the interpretant, which may 
be differently inflected by every reader. 
Adorno and Negative Dialectic
This proposed convergence of semiosis and bibliography, which may 
seem a strange one at first, requires recourse to the only other possible 
way out of the stalemate that I am able to see: namely, to adopt a chron-
ological model of the continually unfolding relationship between docu-
ment and text, or between cultural object and interpretation.
The writings of the Frankfurt School philosopher, Theodor Adorno 
(1903–69) offer such a model. It is not Adorno’s aesthetic theory that I 
find helpful20 but rather his central concept of negative dialectics. Giving 
the Kantian notion of the subject–object binary an epistemological twist, 
Adorno argued that subjects, situated in history as they are, are not identi-
cal with themselves over time. Nor therefore can the object stay still, or be 
self-identical, since it can only be known, over time, as it “entwines with 
subjectivity” (Adorno, 1966/1973, p. 186). As a result, non-identity as be-
tween subject and object has to be taken as the basis of knowledge. The sub-
ject does not, after Kant, passively measure the object against a repository 
of categories that it holds in mind. Rather, through a process of reaching 
out toward the object, the subject seeks to approximate it mimetically in all 
its concrete particularity (to use a Frankfurt School term). Adorno refers to 
this process as “exact fantasy”: the subject transforms the object “into a new 
modality”; it is not a replication but a translation (Buck-Morss, 1977, p. 
88). Peirce had rejected the subject–object binary at its base and replaced 
it with a tri-relational semiotic. Adorno locks subject and object together 
in an experiential embrace. Such requires the other’s difference in order 
to secure its own identity. Each is, as it were, a constituting principle of the 
other. This rules out any appeal to an ontological ideal imagined as stand-
ing outside the process. Semiosis had a similar result for Peirce. 
Take the relationship between nature and history. When beliefs that 
were once resisted become accepted over time, they are granted what 
Adorno calls a second-nature status—they are naturalized—only in turn 
to have their naturalness challenged by awareness of their history of be-
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coming. The process is dialectical but not leading to a higher synthesis, to 
a transcendental reconciliation of subject and object—as with Hegelian 
dialectic, at least as it is popularly known. Rather, the dialectic is nega-
tive in that it is based on awareness of the historicity in nature and of the 
naturalness in history. The one mediates the other.21 In short, a negative 
dialectic describes an ongoing, antithetical but interdependent identity-
relationship that unfolds over time.
There are possibilities here, which Adorno himself did not pursue, for 
conceptualizing the ways in which authors, editors, and readers “perform” 
literary works—or concretize them, to use Ingarden’s term. Adorno’s fa-
vorite example is the way in which a translation transforms its original text 
into something new. We might think that, in the act of reading, the text 
with which we engage and which we seek mimetically to approximate or 
perform is the literary work itself. But a little bibliographic attunement 
shows that it is a document of paper and ink that bears a text that we raise 
in the act of reading. While in Adorno’s sense the document is a natural 
object, it is also a socially produced one that anticipates the observance of 
accepted conventions of raising meaning. The document, whether hand-
written or printed, is the textual site where the agents of textuality meet: 
author, copyist, editor, typesetter, and reader. In the acts of writing, copy-
ing or reading, the work’s documentary and textual dimensions dynami-
cally interrelate; they can be seen as a translation or performance of one 
another. They are, in this sense, one another’s negative constituting prin-
ciple. Document, taken as the material basis of text, has a continuing his-
tory in relation to its productions and its readings. Any new manifestation 
of the negative dialectic necessarily generates new sets of meanings. 
A consequence is that, if the documentary and textual dimensions are 
one another’s negative constituting principle, then neither has a secure 
identity in itself. In other words, we need potentially readable text before 
paper and ink can constitute a document. To have text, we need a mate-
rial document (in any medium, whether printed, a computer-screen visu-
alization, or sound waves in an act of vocalization). The two dimensions 
are conceptually separable but linked in practice. The work emerges only 
as a regulative idea, the name or container, as it were, of the continuing 
dialectic. The ongoing or recorded existence of the document is enough 
to link all the textual processes that are carried out under the name of 
the work. And bibliography is a technology for describing and relating its 
allied documents.
Following Ingarden, we can say that this is the “life” of the literary 
work—but without accepting the idealist belief that, for him, goes with 
it. Peirce’s account of semiosis allows us to dispense with that; and its ca-
pacity, when applied as I have suggested, to incorporate agency and dia-
chronicity sits happily enough with Adorno’s unfolding dialectic. From 
Adorno we can define a concept of the work that does not sublate or 
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supersede the empirical workings of textuality. The “work” can be seen as 
a phenomenological concept—not in the full, Husserlian sense of an in-
tentional object, but in the weak sense that it operates as a regulative idea 
that immediately dissolves, in reading, into the negative dialectic of docu-
ment and text. Seen as a regulative idea, the “work” retains its function 
as a pragmatic agreement for organizing our remembered experiences 
of reading documents that are closely related bibliographically and for 
delimiting the relevance of documents being investigated for their rel-
evance to an editing project: for an edition of the “work.” 
Seen in action the “work” unravels, in every moment of its being, into 
a relationship between its documentary and textual dimensions. If it can, 
then, no longer be imagined as a historical object (as in Tanselle’s “in-
tended text”), then the idealist position that seeks to secure its self-identity 
must be abandoned. The dynamic principle I am proposing is offered as 
an alternative that answers to the richly various lives of the work to which 
editorial commentators have been drawing attention since the 1980s.
If such is the basis of the textual condition, then the editor (like every 
other reader) can never get outside it; the work can never be an object 
on which he or she works. Instead the editor must have—can only have—a 
participatory role in the life of the work. The editor’s main work is textual; 
it leaves a documentary testament. Editions (as documents) represent the 
work by extending its life, by making further textual encounters possible: 
there can be no definite closure to a negative dialectic. One thing we can 
say for sure is that the work is not an aesthetic object if only because that 
traditional formulation collapses these interdependent dimensions. 
Buildings and Monuments As Works: the Obligation of 
Their Carers
But can this conclusion be extended to include artistic works, historic 
buildings, and monuments? Potential complications should not shut down 
the attempt to map the conclusion across. Some remarks of Gary Taylor 
suggest a pathway. He is the general editor of a project to edit the works 
of Thomas Middleton (1580–1627), a playwright whose achievement has 
always been occluded by that of his great contemporary, Shakespeare. 
“How can you love a work, if you don’t know it?,” Taylor asks. “How can 
you know it, if you can’t get near it? How can you get near it, without 
editors?” (1993, p. 133). This simple, rhetorical argument could equally 
be applied to the conservation of historic buildings or the restoration of 
damaged paintings: you can’t love them if you can’t see them or touch 
them: if you can’t, in Heidegger’s sense, be-with-them. But this still leaves 
unresolved exactly what the “it,” that Taylor speaks of, consists in.
To envisage the work as I am proposing, as constantly involved in a 
negative dialectic of material medium (the documentary dimension) 
and meaningful experience (the textual), and as being constituted by an 
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unrolling semiosis across time, necessarily interweaved in the lives of all 
who create it, gaze at it or read it, is to recognize, among other things, 
the roles of agency and time. Depending on the perspective in play, the 
agency of authorship broadly considered (whether of playwright, archi-
tect, sculptor, or editor) may be foregrounded; some intending person 
or persons had to create the “document,” which, from this point of view, 
will be forever embedded in that moment. Equally the latter experience, 
the unrolling semiosis, may be focused on: the role (or, as an editor would 
say of a readership, the authority) of the people, say, who lived around 
the historic building may gain significance. It certainly did for Ruskin in 
1849 as he considered the plight of fourteenth-century English churches 
subject to the new, religiously-inspired craze for restoration: “We have no 
right whatever to touch them,” he declared. “They are not ours. They belong 
partly to those who built them, and partly to all the generations of man-
kind who are to follow us. The dead still have their right in them.” The 
walls “that have long been washed by the passing waves of humanity” only 
gradually acquire their living value—what he called “that golden stain of 
time” (1910, pp. 358, 339, 340). 
From this point of view, to detach the work from its idealist grounding 
in the absent architect-author does not necessarily remove the basis of 
its identity. To think of the building or monument as a work rather than 
merely a three-dimensional (documentary) object is to recognize that its 
meanings are not fully determined in advance by builder or architect. 
They are also assigned (in the textual dimension) by those who come into 
contact with the (documentary) object. Semiotic appeals to meaning will 
be embedded in conventions of reading architecture, in the functions of 
buildings within broader circulating discourses, and they will be assigned 
variously, and change over time. Thus, adapting Adorno, the building as 
work does not stay identical with itself.
This stands to reason. The historic building, any historic building will 
always have been in a process involving, in varying degrees, conscious al-
teration, accidental change, and natural decay. The building does not and 
cannot have a stable constitution. Given the loss of furnishings, the limita-
tions of contemporary catalogs of furniture and decorations by which the 
present deficiency might be made good, the usually radical changes in the 
surrounding gardens (the effect of natural growth, neglect, or changes in 
style of gardening) and loss of land through subdivision and sale; given 
also the common absence of original plans and (depending on the age of 
the building) of photographic documentation of it, and the limited help-
fulness of early watercolor and other sketches—given all of these factors, 
a historic house cannot be reliably returned in every detail to its original 
condition, even if this were desirable. And yet most visitors to heritage 
buildings believe this is what they are seeing. They want to believe that the 
Neoplatonic ideal of the house-as-it-originally-was is here embodied. 
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If conservators and curators necessarily participate in the building’s 
unrolling semiosis, in the life of it as a work, then they need to accept the 
responsibility that this awareness entails and not cater to illusions. Nor 
should they pretend to stand outside it as if it were only a (documentary) 
object to which they apply their science and taste. Management plans for 
historic buildings that appeal in a 1960s way to the famous architect as 
guarantor of the building-as-work’s near-perfect integrity—almost as if 
it were a poem or painting, a “concrete work of art”—need to beware 
of appealing in the next sentence to the necessity of preserving the his-
torical witness of the building’s original fabric. Both appeals falsely objec-
tify the building. Appeals that flip-flop between historical and aesthetic 
groundings for the work are not likely to lead to coherent editorial solu- 
tions.22
Historic buildings exist and persist, if they are suffered to do so, as 
“document,” stolidly awaiting their fate. Meanwhile their further semiosis 
unrolls in the lives of their inhabitants and of passersby. Buildings con-
tinue to undergo change in response to people’s needs. Clearly, the pres-
ervation of the documentary fabric must be the primary aim and ethic 
of conservators. This is what conservation must conserve since, without 
it, that life of the building as a work is impossible or impoverished. We 
would not be able to get “near” it. But, in this formulation, what is the 
“it”? It is not an object pure and simple, since, under the conservatorial 
gaze the building’s documentary fabric cannot be left alone. Some atti-
tude toward its preservation must be arrived at, some standard appealed 
to. This involves making choices about what aspect of the building’s life, 
what source of authority for its presentation as a work, the conservator 
will decide to respect. And what alterations or partial destruction will be 
deemed necessary so that the general public can be “near” it. 
The documentary dimension of the building only functions under the 
conservatorial gaze as fabric insofar as it is part of a negative dialectic 
with its interpretations. There is no innocent, no inevitable policy avail-
able, even though the simple, common-sense language of such heritage-
policy documents as the Venice Charter of 1964 and the Australia ICO-
MOS Burra Charter of 1992 give rise to the hope that there is. We have 
to accept that the conservation and the curation will inevitably alter the 
nature, by shifting the grounds, of the building’s continuing semiosis.
Honest curation will declare the compromise, will declare its interpret-
ing hand. Whether, say, the building and contents have been preserved so 
far as possible to represent some point in their history, or perhaps as an 
inevitably partial and selective three-dimensional diary of the lives of the 
generations of families that have lived in it. Usually, with historic build-
ings, curation performs something of the function that annotation does 
in a scholarly edition, selectively pointing the reader-viewer toward what 
to look for in the fabric, giving advice as to how to read its historical testi-
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mony, and therefore by implication how to understand the conservatorial 
orientation and policy that have been applied. 
The expansion over the last twenty years of the possible, legitimate 
grounds of textual authority for the editing of literary works has been 
paralleled by more flexible policies of curation, such as those I have just 
described. In both pursuits, the avoidance of ad hoc or self-contradictory 
policies could be avoided, and aims clarified, by a more conscious un-
derstanding of the nature of the work. The present essay is offered as a 
contribution to that debate.
Notes 
 1.  Together with new work, this essay adapts material from other essays by the present author 
listed in References and Additional Reading. 
 2.  It is Nelson Goodman’s (1968, chap. 3). Other definitional problems lay in wait for it: 
silk-screen prints, conceptual art, arte povera and found objects, and protest art where 
commercially printed or manufactured objects deliberately replace handmade or painted 
ones. 
 3.  See further Runia and van Suchtelen (2006, pp. 40–47).
 4.  Discussed in Eggert (2005).
 5.  Tanselle avoids talk of “ideal” texts but his argument that the intended text of the work is 
historical though unachieved implies ideality: see Eggert (1998c). The text can be the one 
intended by whomever the editor deems to be the source of authority for the purposes 
of the edition—not necessarily the author.
 6.  Husserl’s postponing extended to any subject-independent entity whether noumenal 
(things-in-themselves) or phenomenal (their appearances). He wanted to study the con-
structivity of the mind—not the empirical objects nor their phenomenal appearances, 
but the experiencing of objects by the mind. He invented the special meaning of the 
existing term phenomenology to cover this interest.
 7.  See Tanselle (1990, p. 31 and n. 9) [an essay that originally appeared in 1976].
 8.  The editor and translator Grabowicz’s term, Introduction to Ingarden (1931/1973, p. 
xix).
 9.  Grabowicz (see preceding note) reports that in the Polish revised translation of 1960 
Ingarden “warns that he now questions [the] existence” of ideal concepts; this reflects 
his “later commitment to realism” (Ingarden, 1931/1973, p. lix).
 10.  Grabowicz—who is very sympathetic to Ingarden’s thought—is less circumspect in his 
averrals that the work is a “purely intentional formation, ‘transcendent to all conscious 
experiences, those of the author as well as those of the reader’” (Ingarden, 1931/1973, 
p. lviii; the last is a quotation from Ingarden’s The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, orig. 
in Polish 1937). When Grabowicz tries to draw out the idea, he states that the work is 
“finally an intersubjective intentional object [i.e., in relation to all readers] constituted . . . 
on the basis of a constant and faithful intentional reference to some given real object 
which is the work of art itself” (Ingarden, 1931/1973, p. xxi). The definition is circular, 
and it leaves aside the question of the way in which the work may be said to be “given.” 
 11.  In her forthcoming book, Text as Process: An Exploration of Creative Composition in the 
Work of Wordsworth, Tennyson and Emily Dickinson, Sally Bushell argues that there is room 
in Heidegger’s thinking to allow such study despite its admitted inauthenticity (see chap. 
10).
 12.  Sartre defines as a “new absolute . . . The age [which] is the intersubjectivity, the 
living absolute, the dialectical underside of history” (1947/1988, p. 241). The link between 
Barthes and Sartre is made in Bushell (in press), Text as Process (see preceding note). 
She comments that awareness of it “should cause a re-definition of our understanding 
of what Barthes means by his title [“The Death of the Author”] and a reminder of the 
historicized nature of his statement” (chap. 2). I thank Sally Bushell for allowing me to 
quote from this work prior to its publication.
 13.  For process, see Shillingsburg (1991) and Cohen and Jackson (1991). For electronic 
103
editing, see Finneran (1996) and McGann (2001). For the linking of texts to their audi-
ences, see McKenzie (1986). For meanings in physical documents, see any of the writings 
of Randall McLeod, e.g.for example, “Enter Reader” (1998) [where the author’s name 
is playfully given as “Random Cloud”] and McGann (1991).
 14.  German historical-critical editing practice claims, or at least claimed, to be grounded in 
Prague structuralism, from which source it took its definition of text as a semiotic system 
altered by any alteration of words or punctuation in it. The central job is therefore to 
construct an archival apparatus of variants around any one of the extant texts of the work. 
There is no warrant for the textual intervention by appeal to intention typical of Anglo-
American editions. In my view, the claimed grounding has led to some contradiction and 
complacency: see Eggert (1998a).
 15.  Nevertheless Peirce sometimes despaired of being able to explain his conception. In a 
letter of 23 December 1908 to Lady Welby he wrote: a sign is “anything which is so deter-
mined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, 
which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by 
the former.” He goes on to say “My insertion of ‘upon a person’ is a sop to Cerberus, 
because I despair of making my own broader conception understood” (Hardwick, 1977, 
pp. 80–81).
 16.  Peirce is chiefly remembered for the doctrine that the meaning of an idea lies 
in its practical outcomes, but this ignores the semiotic underlay that was at the centere 
of his thinking. Even in a quite early essay he wrote: “Consider what effects, that might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. 
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object” (Peirce 
1931–58, 5.2 [i.e., vol. 5, numbered paragraph 2]). A modern edition of Peirce’s works 
is in progress, though it will not be a complete works. For commentaries on Peirce’s 
philosophy, see Gallie (1952), Apel (1981), Hookway (1985), Keeler and Kloesel (1996), 
and Keeler (1998).
 17.  See Martens (1995, pp. 214–215). Martens cites Köller (1977) as source of this 
interpretation. 
 18.  (Peirce 1931–58, 6.620).  Peirce himself had been a research chemist, and this was 
undoubtedly the source of his model. See further Searle (1994).
 19.  Bibliographical questions seem not to have impinged on Peirce’s accounts of semio-
sis. Signs he says are not things; things (objects) cannot be replicated, only represented. 
Representations, however, can be replicated: “Look down a printed page [Peirce once 
remarked], and every the you see is the same word, every e the same letter. A real thing 
does not so exist in replica”: quoted in (Keeler, 1998, p. 175), from a Peirce manuscript 
of 1904. Peirce denies that ideas can be reproduced: “taking the word ‘idea’ in the sense 
of an event in an individual consciousness, it is clear that an idea once past is gone for-
ever, and any supposed recurrence of it is another idea” (Peirce, 1931–58, 6.105). This is 
because any representation of the idea creates its own, new interpretant. The same would 
be true of the idea in printed form as the reader raises the documentary representa-
tion onto the level of text. The meaning raised is never absolutely predictable from the 
documentary representation, for, as Peirce says elsewhere: “no Sign is absolutely precise 
. . . and indefiniteness is of two kinds, indefiniteness as to what is the Object of the Sign, 
and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant” (Peirce, 1931–58, 4.543).
 20.  Aesthetic Theory was collected only after his death. It is partly caught up in Walter Ben-
jamin’s broad-brush Marxist rejection of “the aesthetics of genius” (Adorno, 1970/1984, 
p. 244)—the work seen as the reflection of the creative personality. Adorno saw it as a 
facile explanation of a complex process and Benjamin as a capitalist diversion from the 
real business of the artist’s altering the relations of production. For Adorno, the “artist’s 
absolute act [of putting pen to paper, brush to canvas] . . . is of minuscule importance” 
(1970/1984, p. 239). However “the moment of making or fabrication” is of importance 
(p. 244) because the artist, at that moment, “functions as the executor” of the relation 
between subject and object (p. 2389). But Adorno’s major interest in art is its potential to 
help us escape political ideology and social repression: the rise of fascism and the failure 
of Marxism deeply affected his thinking.
 21.  As Adorno once famously said: “History is in the truth; the truth is not in history” (as 
cited in Buck-Morss, 1977, p. 46). Adorno did not invent the notion of negative dialectic; 
it goes back to Socrates and early Plato.
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 22.  Eighteenth-century editors who improved Shakespeare’s lines on the grounds that 
the master could not have been capable of imperfect metremeter (i.e., editing by an 
aesthetic criterion) have long been the butt of jokes. Their taste did not last the historical 
distance.
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